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Abstract. We consider the following question: given a group-homomorphic
public-key encryption E, a ciphertext c = E(x, pk) hiding a value x using
a key pk, and a ”suitable” description of a function f , can we evaluate
E(f(x), pk) without decrypting c? We call this an oblivious lookup table
and show the existence of such a primitive. To this end, we describe a
concrete construction, discuss its security and relations to other cryp-
tographic primitives, and point out directions of future investigations
towards generalizations.
Keywords. homomorphic encryption; private function evaluation; se-
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1 Introduction and Concept
This short note is about the following setting: let f : X → Y be a
mapping between finite sets. Assume that the sizes of X and Y are
sufficiently small to permit a specification of f via a lookup-table. Let
E(m,κ) denote a group-homomorphic encryption of a message m under
a key κ, where E can be symmetric or asymmetric. Let E be group-
homomorphic in the sense that E(m1 · m2, κ) = E(m1, κ) · E(m2, κ),
where · denotes the respective group operations within the plain- and
ciphertext space.
In this setting, we consider the following question: given E and an en-
crypted value c = E(x, κ), can we compute E(f(x), κ) without decrypt-
ing c? We call any such implementation of f an oblivious lookup table,
as it shall effectively hide the evaluation of f , or equivalently, evaluate f
only on ciphertexts by virtue of conventional homomorphic encryption.
Becoming more specifically, let p = 2q+1 be a safe prime (i.e., q is a prime
too), and let G ⊂ Zp denote the q-order subgroup generated by some
element g ∈ Zp. We first describe the lookup technique in plain form,
and subsequently wrap the encryption around the necessary operations.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ G be an enumeration of (distinct) values to be
looked up. To each such element xi, we associate a vector vi = (x
k
i )
n−1
k=0 =
(1, xi, x
2
i , . . . , x
n−1
i ). Notice that xi 6= xj whenever i 6= j implies that the
vectors v1, . . . , vn are all linearly independent, as they essentially form
the rows of a Vandermonde-matrix V . Without loss of generality, let us
assume |X| = n = |Y |, say, by allowing multiple occurrences of the same
element in Y in case that f is not injective. Under this convention, let
the (not necessarily pairwise distinct) elements of Y be enumerated as
Y = {y1, . . . , yn}.
We will construct the value of f(xi) by a scalar product of vi with a
vector-representation of the lookup table. That is, the lookup table itself
is a vector ℓ with the property that vTi · ℓ = f(xi) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
To this end, let us choose an arbitrary but invertible matrix U ∈ Gn×n
with columns u1, . . . ,un. Define the lookup table as ℓ := U ·α for some
(yet to be determined) vector α = (α1, . . . , αn). Now, let us look at the
scalar product of vi with U ·α to yield f(xi) ∈ Zp. This results in a linear
equation α1(v
T
i ·u1)+α2(v
T
i ·u2)+· · ·+αn(v
T
i ·un) = f(xi). Establishing
this condition for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we end up observing that, to find α,
we need to solve the linear system (V ·U) ·α = (f(x1), . . . , f(xn))
T for
α. The coefficient matrix V ·U is invertible by construction, and hence
we can easily lookup values f(xi) by computing f(xi) = v
T
i · ℓ, taking
O(n) multiplications and additions.
Now, let us see if we can equivalently do all the necessary steps when
the pre-image is encrypted. For that matter, we take an element-wise
commitment to the vi from above to represent xi. That is, the value xi
now comes committed and encrypted as E˜(xi, κ) := (E(1, κ), E(g
xi , κ),
E(gx
2
i , κ),. . . , E(gx
n−1
i , κ)) = (c1, . . . , cn), so that the matrix of expo-
nents remains V = (vij)
n
i,j=1 with vij = x
j−1
i and as such invertible.
Since the order of G is a prime, we can – in a setup phase where the
exponents are known – straightforwardly work out the values α and the
lookup table ℓ = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓn), which is supplied in plain (not encrypted)
form to the instance that seeks to evaluate f .
To evaluate f , let the encrypted input value xi be given as E˜(xi, κ).
Then, we can compute the lookup value E(f(xi), κ) as
n∏
k=1
c
ℓk
k =
n∏
k=1
E(gx
k−1
i , κ)ℓk =
n∏
k=1
E(gvik , κ)α1uk1+α2uk2+...αnukn
=
n∏
k=1
E(gα1vikuk1+α2vikuk2+...+αnvikukn , κ) = E(gf(xi), κ). (1)
The last equality is instantly obtained by writing out the exponents for
k = 1, 2, . . . , n and rearranging terms properly when summing up.
A final remark is judicious here: the formula yields only a single value
based on an input vector. To properly implement the lookup to be repeat-
able, i.e., to model iterations like f(f(· · · f(x) · · · )) or generally functions
f : X → X, we need to look up all the elements of the output vector via
separate tables. So, the overall lookup table is no longer a n-dimensional
vector, but an (n × n)-matrix L = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓn). The j-th such lookup
table ℓj must then be designed to return y
j−1, whenever the input value
x is represented by a sequence 1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1 in the exponents. That
is, the mapping f(x) = y, acting on x being represented by encrypted
values 1, gx, gx
2
, . . . , gx
n−1
, requires n lookups that successively yield
1, gy, gy
2
, . . . , gy
n−1
, each of which by (1) requires O(n) exponentiations
and multiplications. So, the total cost of an oblivious lookup comes to
O(n2) exponentiations (subsuming multiplications as the cheaper oper-
ation here).
Considering security, each lookup table is indeed available in plaintext,
but since it is independent of a particular input and the input and output
values remain encrypted at all times, knowledge of L cannot release any
information about the secret x being transferred into the secret result
f(x). Probabilistic encryptions like ElGamal an offer the additional ap-
peal of enforced re-randomization of the resulting ciphertexts. That is,
if a distrusted third party does several lookups, it nevertheless cannot
recognize any results as being identical to previous ones.
2 Related Work
This work closely relates to Private Function Evaluation (PFE), which
provides a system where the function-to-be-evaluated f and the inputs
are private and the evaluator learns nothing about either aside from the
(encrypted) results of the evaluation of the function on the inputs. This
can be realized using Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) over a universal
circuit ([4, 7]), to which f has to be converted first. Another approach is
to use a (non-universal) circuit representation of f and employ a Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme [2, 6]. However, all mentioned
approaches carry complexities that are too high for practical applica-
tions. Conceptually closest to our ideas seem to be [3] and [5], both
based on singly homomorphic encryption. The former realises PFE in a
strict two-party setting with one party providing the function and the
other providing the inputs. Evaluation is done through a common virtual
machine. The latter is based on a framework that splits the task into Cir-
cuit Topology Hiding (CTH) and Private Gate Evaluation (PGE) which
together enable PFE with linear complexity in all standard settings.
However, both PFE protocols require an interactive setting while we are
aiming for the non-interactive setting. The security implications tied to
our simple scheme when being lifted to two-operand functions (if that it
possible at all) are, however, far from clear and probably intricate (cf.
[1]) and will be discussed along the research sketched in this abstract.
3 Open Issues
A yet open issue is a proper formalization of security for oblivious lookup
tables. Intuitively, the attacker should be unable to learn anything mean-
ingful from the lookup table as such, since this is nothing but a bunch
of ciphertexts and hence indistinguishable from self-made cryptograms,
provided that the encryption is semantically secure. However, a full-
fledged formal argument and definition of security is subject of future
considerations. Also, the idea does not obviously generalize to functions
of multiple inputs, which poses another interesting question for future
research.
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